Rabi Shankar Chakma

At times, the best decision is not to make any decision. This is how a well-known proverb goes. The BNP-led alliance government seems to have been sticking to this adage ever since it came to power in 2001. Except for some routine changes such as appointment of deputy minister for CHT Affairs, appointment of the Chairman of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board, and reshuffling of the three Hill District Councils, the alliance government has refrained from taking any major decisions with regard to the Chittagong Hill Tracts. This legitimately raises the question: is the government trying to maintain status quo in the CHT?

The question or rather the apprehension is further reinforced by the fact that despite its vehement opposition to the CHT accord the government has allowed the leaders of the Jana Samhati Samiti to continue to occupy the Regional Council. In contrast, the government has replaced the Chairmen and members of the three District Councils with men of its own choice. Ever since their formation in 1989, the district councils have not seen any single member or chairman with affiliation to a party other than the ruling one. Earlier, the Awami League filled the councils with its own party members and so did the autocratic government of Hussain Muhammas Ershad. The previous BNP government and the present BNP-led alliance government just followed suit.

The Hill District Councils were first introduced in 1989 by military dictator General Ershad and was later incorporated with minor modifications into the accord of 1997. The Councils fall far short of the demands of the Hill people and do not function effectively. They are nothing but extensions of the offices of the ruling party. No government has ever bothered to hold elections to these institutions. All this proves that when it comes to the Chittagong Hill Tracts all the mainstream political parties invariably follow the same policy. This explains why the present government has neither abrogated the accord nor implemented it.

While the alliance government’s apparent policy is to maintain status quo in the CHT, it has given Mr. Wadud Bhuiyan MP a free hand in matters relating to “development” in CHT. Violating all norms and conventions and the CHT treaty itself, the government appointed him as the Chairman of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board. This made him the boss of the CHT overnight as all the “development funds” of the government are channelised to the Board, depriving all other institutions including the Regional Council. This is the primary reason which drove the Jana Samhati Samiti to take up anti government action programmes in the last few months. One wonders whether the JSS leaders would have gone for such programmes if a few crumbs had fallen on to their table or if the Regional Council had absolute control over the CHTDB. However, the interesting aspect of this development is that it has laid bare the pathetic situation of the Regional Council. It has all the trappings of power, but the real power lies with the Deputy Commissioners and the government-controlled institutions of the CHT such as the CHTDB and the District Councils. The Regional Council is a misnomer. UPDF stands vindicated on this count.

Taking advantage of the prevailing situation and (ab)using his authority, Mr. Wadud Bhuiyan MP is now trying to consolidate his personal position. As soon as he assumed chairmanship of the CHTDB, the meaning, tone and tenor of development has changed overnight. Over the years the CHTDB has been under serious criticism for many of its programmes that were undertaken with total disregard of the opinion of the Hill people. Many critics say that the erstwhile government of Ziaur Rahman established the CHTDB in 1976 to achieve some politico-military objectives. The crucial role played by the CHTDB in the so-called counter-insurgency warfare is well known. Until recently the GOC (General Officer Commanding) used to be the ex-officio chairman of this development body. However, with the surrender of the Shanti Bahini guerrillas in 1998, the need for direct military control over the CHTDB has come to an end, and the government opened up the chairmanship of the Board to the civilians. The first non-military civilian to occupy the chairmanship of the CHTDB was Bir Bahadur MP, a member of the Awami League. He lost his job when the BNP came back to power in 2001.

Since its establishment, the CHTDB has always been the central focus of the politics of development in CHT. Just as the military used this body to achieve its military objectives, so now the ruling party is using it to consolidate its position. There are serious allegations against the Board’s Chairman of diverting funds to fake projects to benefit his party members, creating a personal fiefdom Wadud Palli and undertaking projects that have the potentials to eventually evict hill people from their hearts and homes – all in the name of development.

In its last election manifesto the Banglasdesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which is opposed to the CHT treaty of 1997, pledged to find a political solution to the CHT crisis. The party secured two of the three seats in CHT in the said election, a rare feat for the BNP. But up until now the party has failed to live up to its promise. Although the BNP never said what it had meant by “political solution”, the pledge however tends to imply that the party does not consider the Awami League – PCJSS treaty as a comprehensive political solution. Otherwise it would not have raised the slogan of political solution.

There may be different and often conflicting interpretations of this vague term, but the ruling BNP-led coalition government could have by this time initiated a political dialogue to find a permanent solution to the most vexed and outstanding issues of the CHT. That it did not do so is a clear testimony to its policy of maintaining status quo in the CHT region. However, there is still time for the government to initiate a dialogue process that would include all the regional political parties of the CHT. Better late then never. The CHT issue deserves immediate attention of the government. The policy of keeping status quo makes no sense; it does not solve anything, rather it complicates the issues. We hope the government would understand this fact and act before it is too late.

[The writer is a member, convening committee, United Peoples Democratic Front (UPDF)]

The Bangladesh constitution, which was adopted on the 4th of November 1972 and came into effect on16 December in the same year, begins with the Islamic words “BISMILLAH-AR-RAHAMAN-AR-RAHIM” (In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful). This was inserted through the Proclamation (Amendment) Order, 1977 (Proclamation Order No. 1 of 1977). In fact, since its inception, the constitution has undergone many amendments, the latest one being the thirteenth amendment, and through this provisions have been made for the installation of a Non-party Caretaker government after the dissolution of the Jatyo Sangsad. Most of the other amendments were made either to provide for absolute power in the hands of a single party or to abridge civil and political rights of the citizens of the country. Even for the gratification of self-interest of some individual politicians and army generals, the Supreme law of the land had to be cut to size. The Sixth Amendment of the constitution is a case in point. This change in the Constitution was made to favour Abdus Sattar so that he could become eligible to stand as the BNP candidate for 1981 presidential election. But it is an irony that, when it comes to the question of the constitutional recognition of the national minorities, this vary political elite who brought about such changes and amendments refuse to amend the constitution on the pretext that the national minorities are insignificantly few in number. But what they refuse to understand is the fact that it is for the greater interest of the whole country, and not for a tiny section of it, that such a constitutional amendment has become necessary.

However, due to all these amendments the constitution has lost its original character and it has been highly Islamised. In fact this process of Islamisation of the constitution started during the rule of Ziaur Rahaman with the insertion of Islamic words. But it was General Hussain Muhammad Ershad who has completed this process by declaring Islam as state religion through the Eighth Amendment. Article 2A says, “The state religion of the Republic is Islam, but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in the republic”. With this insertion, one of the religions as practiced in this country has been placed above the other ones, and discrimination and religious prosecution against other religious groups intensified.

In the Preamble the constitution declares that “absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah, nationalism, democracy and socialism meaning economic and social justice… shall be the fundament principle of the Constitution”. Further, in the chapter on fundamental principles of state policy, article 8(1) says, “The principles absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah, nationalism, democracy and socialism meaning economic and social justice, together with the principles derived from them as set out in this Part, shall constitute the fundamental principles of state policy”.

Again clause 1A of the said article provides that “Absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah shall be the basis of all actions”. One can aptly ask: are the actions of the ministers and other persons in the service of the state, who belong to religions other than Islam, based on “absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah?” Whatever the intention of these amendments, at least theoretically, the non-Muslims are bound by this article, and in their actions relating to the service of the republic or the running of the state they are required by the constitution to place their faith and trust in the Almighty Allah. I do not know how the others would interpret this article of the constitution. But so far I have never seen any protest or objection being raised by any section.

It hardly needs to be mentioned here that the Bangladesh constitution does not recognise the distinct identities of the National minorities of the country. After liberation, Manobendra Narayan Larma, one of the two elected MPs from the CHT, submitted a memorandum to the Constitution Committee headed by the then Law minister Dr. Kamal Hossain and put forward the demand for regional autonomy. He also fought for the just rights of the Jumma people in the Jatya Sangsad and raised the demand for the recognition of the national minorities of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. But his demand fell on the deaf ears of the boastful Awami League leaders. Larma refused to endore the draft constitution bill and walked out of the house in protest.

When General Ershad brought the Eighth Amendment into the constitution making Islam as state religion, almost all the political parties worth the name including Awami League and BNP protested against it, and held that this went against the main spirit of the constitution and impaired the secular image of the country. But it is irony that when these two parties came to power in succession, none took the initiative to repeal the Eighth Amendment.

The 1972 constitution made provision to the effect that all the citizens of the republic are Bengali. Article 6 of the original constitution says, the citizens of Bangladesh shall be known as Bengalis. But this article was changed later during the rule of Ziaur Rahaman, who termed the citizens of the country as Bangladeshi. The Bengali identity of the citizens created a lot of controversy and debate, and the Jumma people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts protested this and asserted that they are not Bengali, they have their own identity, though as citizens of the country they are Bangladeshi.

Thus it is quite clear that the constitution discriminates against the national minorities and does not reflect their hopes and aspirations. It is highly islamised and gives expression to the Bengali chauvinism. It also gives preferential treatment to the Bengalis, the dominant ethnic group, over the others.

Bangladesh is a multi-racial multi-cultural heterogeneous country where a number of ethnic minorities have been living side by side with the Bengalis for centuries. It is expected that the constitution should accommodate them and protect their rights by giving recognition to their distinct identity and culture. We need such a constitution which will provide equal footing to all the nations and national minorities within this country and give them equal rights so that no ethnic group would be able to enjoy special privilege by virtue of its being majority. Only such a constitution can be termed as democratic.

The article was published in Bangladesh Observer on June 15, 2003

No accord will be able to bring peace in the CHT unless the government recognizes the rights and identity of indigenous Jumma people and take effective measures for promotion and protection of their rights, writes Rabi Shankar Chakma

Six years have elapsed since the signing of the much-vaunted CHT Accord of 2 December 1997. The accord was signed after a protracted negotiation between the government of Bangladesh and the Jana Samhati Samiti for five years. It is often said such protracted negotiations becomes more successful than summit level accord because of the ability to identify pros-cons of an accord and therefore develop in-built mechanisms for its better implementation. Alas! The CHT accord did not contain such in-built mechanisms for implementation. The aim to “uphold the political, social, cultural, educational and economic rights of all the people of Chittagong Hill Tracts region, to expedite socio-economic development process and to preserve respective rights of all the citizens of Bangladesh and their development” has little meaning for indigenous peoples of the CHT.

Among the major shortcomings of the Accord was the negotiation process itself. It was neither transparent nor democratic. Both the JSS and the government kept the citizens of the country in dark about the whole process, let alone making them part of it. The whole thing was done in a secretive way as if everything would turn up side down if the people knew about it.

The in-built mechanisms are crucial for smooth implementation. When an agreement is signed, there arise certain obligations for the parties to perform. The breach of such an agreement should normally be settled before the court of law. This is the general rule relating to contractual obligation. But contracts of political nature, that is the accords and treaties signed between the political parties and states, are quite different. Courts cannot enforce such accords although courts can question validity of such accord. Aggrieved parties do not have the right to seek redress in law courts. That’s why governments has shown contempt for such accord and history of indigenous peoples all over the world is replete with instances of such failed accords.
The CHT accord enunciated the obligations to be fulfilled both by the Jana Samhati Samiti (JSS) and the government of Bangladesh. The JSS performed all its obligations before the government performed any single obligation on its part. As per the CHT treaty the JSS was bound to do so within a specific time frame. However, this became the source of all later discords between the two sides. Once the JSS lost all leverage against the government, the then Awami League government found it expedient to back out. Acceptance of such provisions by JSS was tantamount to giving carte-blanch to the government.

At the beginning the JSS leaders were over enthusiastic about the accord. They placed unqualified trust and faith in the Awami League government. On many occasions the JSS supremo Santu Larma said that he had full confidence in the government of the then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. But it took only a few months before they were completely disillusioned with the Awami League. Soon after their surrender the JSS leaders could realize that their arithmetic of politics of Bangladeshi ruling parties was totally wrong. They found out in no time that they have been betrayed. So the honeymoon between the two sides proved to be too short-lived. The first discord between the Awami League and the Jana Samhati Samiti arose when the JSS leaders publicly made a claim that there was an unwritten agreement in addition to the Accord signed. When the Awami League did not have any interest to implement the written accord, it was fanciful to the extreme to expect the Awami League to discuss any verbal accord. It was simply a case of inability of the JSS leaders to understand the Awami League, and for that matter the character of the ruling parties of Bangladesh. The JSS also accused the AL of violating the terms of the agreement when the government nominated three members for the Interim Regional Council from the Bengali community in total disregard of the JSS recommendation. In protest against this action of the government the JSS refused to take over the charge of the Interim Regional Council. But JSS could not hold on to its position. After nine months they had to give in, as the government threatened to reconstitute the Interim Regional Council to resolve the stalemate. The JSS leaders felt they might be left out.

The JSS leaders consistently accused the previous Awami League government of violating the CHT accord. They are now grumbling against the ruling BNP led four party alliance. However, their grumble does not go beyond the nuisance value, lest the BNP government may dislodge them from the Regional Council either through elections or summary removal.

The CHT accord is now in limbo. The BNP and its alliance partners vehemently opposed the treaty when they were in opposition. They demanded that the treaty be scraped as it compromised the sovereignty of the county. BNP went to the extent of organising a so-called “long march” from Dhaka to Khagrachari to boost support for their demand. So it is quite understandable that the alliance government has little interest in the implementation of the accord. This makes the future of the accord all the more uncertain. Even after six years, the accord remains unimplemented. The accord has failed because of its sheer non-implementation due to the lack of in-built mechanism. The implementation of the CHT accord totally depends on the charity of the government. This is the most pathetic aspect of the accord.

The United Peoples Democratic Front (UPDF) and its sister organisations namely Hill Students Council, Hill Peoples Council and Hill Women’s Federation expressed serious reservations about the accord. They pointed out its shortcomings and maintained that unless the main demands of the CHT people are met the much-cherished peace will remain a far cry. They voiced their criticism when almost the whole country was gripped by euphoria about the accord. But once the euphoria subsided and the dust settled down, every thing became clear. The post accord situation has vindicated UPDF assumptions. Even the topmost leader of the JSS acknowledged that he has committed a grave mistake by signing the accord.

The accord of 1997 may be historically important, but it is not the first of its kind. The CHT people are witness to two other similar agreements. The aim of both of these agreements was to resolve the Chittagong Hill Tracts problem. The first agreement was signed in 1985 with the Priti Kumar faction of the JSS. This resulted in the surrender of its members at Rangamti Stadium much like the formal surrender of the main JSS on 15 February 1988 at Khagrachari stadium. It should be noted that many good things were written in the said agreement, although it too remained largely unimplemented. The other agreement was signed in 1989 with some selected so-called traditional Jumma leaders of three CHT districts. This was the agreement which paved the way for the formation of the controversial Hill District Councils. As everyone knows, none of these agreements was able to resolve the problems.

In conclusion, the accord of 1997 has already met the same fate of the two other agreements mentioned above. A historic accord is now in the process of being consigned to history. It is a pity that the CHT people will have to witness such a tragedy. However, no accord will be able to bring peace in the CHT unless the government recognizes the rights and identity of indigenous Jumma people and take effective measures for promotion and protection of their rights. The sooner the government develops the democratic attitude to address the demands of its ethnic minorities, the sooner peace will return to the CHT.
(On this day in 1997, a landmark deal was reached on peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts)

The writer is a member of the Convening Committee of the United Peoples Democratic Front

The article was published in the New Age on December 2, 2003