
By Milton Chakma, Organizer, UPDF
A notable feature of post-Accord politics in the Chittagong Hill Tracts has been the cycles of war and peace between the UPDF and the JSS. Although JSS chief Santu Larma initially rejected proposals for talks with the UPDF, he later found himself cornered under resistance and pressure and himself proposed dialogue to the UPDF. On 6 December 2025, an article titled “UPDF in the Resistance Struggle Against Land Grabbing During the State of Emergency” discussed the agreements reached between the UPDF and the JSS in 2006 and 2007. Today’s article sheds light on the 2018 agreement.
At the outset, it should be noted that the two parties also sat for talks once before, in 2000, and agreed to halt conflict. At that time, JSS supreme leader Santu Larma was in India. In his absence, other JSS leaders in Khagrachari took the initiative to hold talks with the UPDF and concluded that agreement. However, Santu Larma did not accept it. Immediately after returning from India, he annulled the agreement and continued attacks on the UPDF.
On the one hand, the UPDF built resistance against JSS attacks; on the other, it vigorously campaigned for dialogue and unity, which received wide public support. Even a large section of the JSS came to favor unity over conflict. Because of this correct policy of the UPDF, the JSS faced the prospect of a split around the time of its party conference in late 2005. In this context, to preserve his own position, Santu Larma proposed talks to the UPDF. The long-anticipated dialogue then took place, and in the first half of 2006 both parties reached an agreement to halt hostilities. However, just a few days after the third meeting, the JSS violated the terms of the agreement and resumed attacks on the UPDF.
Although Santu Larma managed to form a central committee of his choosing at the conference, he could not prevent a split within his party. As attacks on the UPDF continued, internal conflict within the JSS reached an extreme level. Senior leaders of his party—including Rupayan Dewan, Sudhasindhu Khisa, and Raktotpal Tripura—along with a large section of the party, rebelled against Santu Larma. As a result, Santu Larma’s loyalists were forced to abandon the entire Khagrachari district and large areas of Rangamati district. It was in this context that Santu Larma again approached the UPDF, humbly proposing talks. In 2007, the two parties reached another agreement, known as the Sajek Agreement.
After the Sajek Agreement, Santu Larma’s loyalists moved to the Mizoram border in India and, taking advantage of the non-aggression terms, focused on building their strength by procuring weapons, ammunition, and recruiting personnel. Meanwhile, the UPDF organized the people against land grabbing that had begun in the Chittagong Hill Tracts during the state of emergency and built resistance. Through this process of struggle, the UPDF was able to expand its organizational activities not only in Khagrachari but also in Rangamati’s Longadu, Jurachari, Baghaichari, Bilaichari, and Rajasthali.
The Sajek Agreement lasted approximately until 2010. After rebuilding its strength, the Santu group violated the terms of the 2007 agreement and first resumed attacks on the UPDF in Jurachari. On 21 May 2011, one of their armed units shot and killed UPDF leader Animesh Chakma and three other members in Midingyachari of Subalong upazila. Animesh Chakma had earned a master’s degree from Rajshahi University before joining the UPDF, and in 2007–08 he successfully led resistance struggles in Dighinala—especially against the grabbing of land belonging to the Sadhanatila Bana Vihara (Buddhist Temple).
When the conflict resumed, the UPDF was compelled to build resistance against the Santu group. At one point, as the JSS Santu group weakened again, it proposed talks to the UPDF in mid-2015. The UPDF agreed, and after three rounds of discussion, on 5 February 2018 the two parties reached a three-point agreement. The terms were:
1. Each party would carry out organizational activities within its own areas of control and would not enter the other party’s organizational areas.
2. Both parties would refrain from attacking each other.
3. Any misunderstandings between the two sides would be resolved through dialogue.
This agreement, too, did not last long. On 5 May 2020, the Santu group violated the agreement by entering UPDF organizational areas in Panchari and Dighinala and engaging in various provocative activities. The UPDF protested both in writing and verbally. On 10 September 2020, JSS leader Shaktipada Tripura acknowledged receipt of the UPDF’s written protest and stated that due to financial difficulties they had been compelled to enter UPDF organizational areas in Panchari and Dighinala, assuring UPDF leader Ujjwal Smriti Chakma that they would leave within a few days. Far from honoring that promise, however, on 21 September Mr. Shaktipada called again and instead leveled false and absurd accusations against the UPDF, alleging violations of the agreement.
Despite the JSS Santu group’s continued presence in UPDF organizational areas and its various provocative and harmful activities in violation of the agreement, the UPDF leadership demonstrated great patience, tolerance, and restraint. They made earnest efforts to resolve the problems that were prevailing between the two sides through dialogue. As a result, communication between the two parties continued through third parties until 8 June 2022.
On that day, the mediators conveyed to the UPDF an oral message from JSS leaders Sugam Babu and Prabhat Babu. Their message was:
1. JSS (Santu) would not attack the UPDF.
2. Their leader Santu Larma had instructed them to strengthen the dialogue process with the UPDF.
3. They did not wish to provide the message in writing for fear it might be leaked.
In response, the UPDF informed them through the mediators that it would provide a full reply to the JSS proposal within the first week of July. But before that, on 11 June, the JSS itself broke its own non-aggression promise and launched simultaneous attacks on the UPDF in Panchari and Dighinala. Since then, the ongoing conflict between the two sides has not ceased.
In conclusion, it can be said that the shameless example of betrayal set by the JSS Santu group—or more specifically by Santu Larma—may be unknown to many. When his party becomes weak, he proposes talks and feigns agreement; but whenever he manages to regain strength, he again pounces on the UPDF. He will one day have to pay the price for this betrayal. Although the UPDF understands Santu Larma’s ploys, it has repeatedly agreed to talks and reached agreements in consideration of the greater interests of the nation and the people. The UPDF will surely reap the rewards of this noble policy and will one day be able to unite all oppressed peoples and nations of the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
(20 December 2025)